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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the proposition that people perceive the status 
of objects in a system differently as a function of their own status 
positions. The neglect of adequate, systematic investigation of the 
problem in the areas of community and occupational prestige is noted 
and the phenomena of differential status perceptions examined with data 
on the popularity judgments within a high school senior class. The 
importance of general and systematic variations in perceptions as a 
function of the perceiver's status position is discussed.
STATUS PERCEPTIONS1
Ever since Marx, ideological theorists have insisted that one's 
position in the social structure profoundly influences his perspective 
on the system. The literature in sociology is full of studies showing 
that social class makes important differences in attitudes, values, and 
life-styles. But there is one area in which consensual perceptions 
across social strata constitute the overwhelming emphasis. Strangely 
enough, this research deals with the very perception of status itself—  
occupational prestige judgments. Davies (1952) searched futilely 
among prestige perception studies for differences in status perceptions 
by the social position of the perceiver, but he had to conclude that 
more than a quarter-century of research revealed only a "remarkable 
consensus".
The impression of remarkable consensus has been reinforced by the 
results reported in the two decades since Davies' review of the literature. 
Study after study stresses correlations of +.98 and better between the 
status judgments of different strata within and between most industrialized 
societies. But this impression— that social position does not influence 
status perceptions— is inconsistent with most societal theories. Further­
more, it conflicts with a vast amount of evidence in psychophysics and 
social psychology (Sherif and Hovland, 1961; Ilelson, 1964) showing that 
a person's position (or anchor standard) on any judgmental scale influences 
his perception of stimuli along that dimension. And, finally, the 
illusion of remarkable consensus simply does not fit the data from many 
of the studies that foster it.
The problem of differential status perceptions is an important one, 
and it needs to be reclaimed as an area deserving sociological scrutiny. 
Aside from the theoretical relevance of the phenomena per se, there are 
many research questions that presume knowledge of and require measure­
ment of status perceptions. For instance: Status incongruity assumes 
preceived distinctions and discrepancies in several status-orders that 
affect a person's self-regard and others' treatments of him. Problems 
of distributive justice necessarily involve placement of self and socially 
compared others in status positions. And, of course, any concern with 
levels of aspiration and achievement orientation fundamentally implicates 
perceived status distinctions.
Status is a critical variable that governs the rights and rules 
of co-orientation and the flow of social interaction. The primary purpose 
of this paper is to establish that systematic perceptual differences do 
exist in status structures as a function of the perceiver's position and 
to suggest that these are general properties of all types of status systems. 
After noting the literature on status perception, new research evidence 
will be presented and its implications discussed.
* * *
The pioneering and now-classic series of studies by W. Lloyd Warner 
(1949) remains the most comprehensive body of research in the area of 
community prestige. The most cogent statement of class-related differences 
in status perceptions that emerged from this series appeared in Davis, 
Gardner, and Gardner (1941, p.72 circa). They noted two tendencies:
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(1) Prestige distinctions decrease in fineness with increasing "social 
distance" between judge and adjudged; and (2) people tend to enhance 
their relative prestige in a system by utilizing many or few judgmental 
categories, so that the number of perceived classes increases with the 
status of the judge.
Lewis (1964) noted that the "social distance" and "ego-enhancement" 
generalizations are somewhat inconsistent and he suggested an appropriate 
reformulation; People make the finest distinctions in those adjacent areas 
of the social structure that are most familiar and relevant to them, but 
they avoid doing so above their own positions, because this tends to loxjer 
self-evaluation. One would expect to find such propositions systematically 
explored with the data from occupational prestige studies, especially since 
these studies have employed more adequate sampling and more sophisticated 
methodological techniques. However, investigators in this area have 
usually been more impressed by the correlational consensus among respondents.
In an extensive analysis of the 1950 NORC data, Reiss briefly comments: 
"The most obvious difference in the ratings of occupations by economic 
level, both in terms of rank and prestige-increment criteria, is the tendency 
for poor people to rate almost all occupations...higher than do the pros­
perous, with the middle class generally intermediate in position" (Reiss, 
1961, p.175)• But the obvious is not stressed.
We can get an idea of the magnitude of these status differences in 
the NORC ratings by considering how people rated those occupations known to 
at least 95 percent of the sample (63 of 90). The percentage of "excellent1 
or "good" ratings received by the lower-status two-thirds of these occupations
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differed substantially by the status of the judge: above-average respond­
ents gave them 34 percent, while below-average respondents gave them 
68 percent "excellent" or "good" ratings. It is indeed obvious that there 
are large differences in the way the occupational prestige hierarchy is 
perceived by respondents at different status levels.
To get a better picture of differential status perceptions as a function 
of the perceiver’s position and to establish the generality of the phenomena 
across a range of status structures, it seemed advantageous to move away 
from the areas of occupational or community prestige. To minimize method­
ological problems "popularity"-status judgments in a high school class were 
selected for investigation. This eliminated entirely the difficulties of 
sampling— especially acute in selecting occupations to be judged— by per­
mitting inclusion of the entire universe of judges and judgmental objects. 
Knowledge could be determined rather directly. Furthermore, an informal 
collectivity has no historically established barriers to communication and 
information nor any specialization of taslc-functions, associational patterns, 
and structurally determined visibility channels. Finally, a high school 
class is sufficiently different from community or national occupational 
prestige structures that claims of generality are more plausible.
The status structures to which these results will be generalized are 
here defined as consensual orderings of persons or positions on a cortsensually 
evaluated dimension by knowledgeable and involved members of a social system. 
For there to be a structure, rank-order consensus must exist; and, further, 
there must be agreement within the collectivity on the evaluation of the 
dimension of judgment (that is, consensus that "high" status is better than
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"low" status). The definition is appropriately broad, including any 
collectivities, from small groups to national societies, in which individuals, 
positions, or attributes are similarly ranked in terms of a consensually 
valued dimension.
Method
A school in a middle income suburb was selected on the basis of socio­
economic composition, class size and geographical dispersion of students.
The 161 students whom the school classified as seniors were asked to judge 
the popularity and to report their "liking" for each of the same-sex others 
in their class. Popularity was judged on a 9-point, unlabelled continuum, 
ranging from LOW to HIGH. Attraction judgments were secured in a similar 
manner, after the popularity responses had been obtained.
To insure that respondents were knowledgeable and the judgmental 
universe "known", judgments by and about students were removed if they did 
not judge or were not judged by eighty percent of their classmates. A person 
was judged unless the respondent "never heard of him" or knew "nothing about 
him at all". Fourteen students were eliminated. The popularity ranking for 
each sex was then determined by the responses of the 147 seniors remaining. 
They were divided into approximately equal thirds (25-24-25 for males, 24- 
25-24 for females). All data were initially analyzed separately by sex 
(Alexander, 1965, pp. 161-187); but they are averaged here, since it simpli­
fies presentation and does not change the conclusions.
Additional students were then eliminated as judges (but not as judg­
mental objects), because they were defined as "non-involved". In part, the 
"knowledge" criterion of elimination was rather loose, and we wanted to
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supplement that basis of exclusion by removing judges who didn't feel a part 
of, or particularly care about, student status attributions. Also, we wanted 
the final population of judges to value and consensually evaluate the status 
dimension of judgment. And, theoretically, involvement was included, because 
it has been such an important variable in studies of other types of displace­
ments in social judgment (Sherif and Hovland, 1961).
Two questions were used to tap involvement, both quite direct: "How 
important is it to you to be popular with your senior classmates here in 
school?" and ״Would you say you are mostly on the ,inside' of things that go 
on around your school?" If the person indicated that he neither felt on the 
inside of things nor felt it important to be popular, he was eliminated as 
"uninvolved". Nearly equal numbers were eliminated from each status level by 
sex; 3, high; 8, middle; and 15, low status males were dropped, while the 
corresponding figures were 2, 7, and 15 for females.
Among the remaining knowledgeable and involved respondents, it is 
requisite that there be some consensus about the rank-ordering of judgmental 
objects. Even though rank-consensus is all that is required, the Pearsonian 
coefficients are convenient and make the lack of difference in comparisons 
among strata even more dramatic. The mean of the correlations between 
individuals' popularity judgments and the (consensually established) mean 
values of the objects rated are remarkably similar— .79, .77, and .76, for 
high, middle, and low status judges, respectively.
Results
Table 1 presents the mean popularity and attraction judgments of involved 
judges' mean judgments, by popularity of the judge and judged. The data on
%popularity show the expected pattern. The lower status judges give everyone 
higher ratings, especially those at their own level. The attraction judgments 
are also of interest. Judges at each level are more attracted to those of 
higher status; but, compared to judges at other levels, lowers find lowers 
more attractive. The contrasting patterns for popularity and attraction show 
that we are not dealing with the "same" phenomenon in these two areas.
-  7 -
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Since there still remains the possibility that "real" knowledge differs 
interactively by status of judge and status of judged, ignorance could 
influence these results. This is an unnecessary complication; because interest 
lies, not in how particular objects are placed, but in the overall judgmental 
pattern as a function of the judge's position. Thus, in the following tables, 
the "objective" status of the person-objects being judged will be ignored.
For each judge the upper, middle, and lower third of the status order will be 
defined by his individual ordering. In other words, judgmental "thirds" refer 
to divisions in each judge's judgmental distribution, rather than to 
"consensual" categorization.
Table 2 shows that differences in mean judgments of upper and lower thirds 
are much greater than mean judgments of consensually classified objects: 
Compared to Table 1, the top third is judged higher and the bottom lower by 
respondents at each position. This indicates that judges at each level make 
"errors" in their status assignments, when the standard of accuracy is the 
overall mean ranking. However, the direction and. magnitude of differences
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among judges at each popularity level are virtually unaffected by changing the 
classification of judgmental objects from an "objective" to a "subjective" 
ordering. The advantage of the subjective distribution is that it eliminates 
any possibility that differential knowledge is affecting the popularity 
distributions of judges at different positions in the system.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Having established that there are systematic "contrast effects" in status 
judgments as a function of the judge's own status position, we can now examine 
the possibility that his perception of his own status independently influences 
a person's status judgments. Respondents were asked to rate their ox!m pop­
ularity. When objective position is held constant, we anticipated that judg­
ments would vary directly with the level of self-placement or subjective 
positioning. Judges were classified to maximize the number in each cell of 
the table: High, if they put themselves in the top three scale categories; 
Low, if self-placed in the bottom four; and liedium, if in the remaining two.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Table 3 presents the mean of each judge's mean popularity judgments in 
each third of his judgmental distribution— by popularity and self-placement. 
The comparisons show that both objective and subjective position influence 
judgments, when the other is held constant. Mean popularity judgments vary 
inversely with the judge's consensually-defined popularity status in 23 of 24 
comparisons (3 ties). They vary directly with the judge's subjectively- 
defined self-placement in 23 of 25 comparisons (2 ties).
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It is clear that substantial and systematic differences exist in the 
perception of status as a function of the perceiver's statuses— as defined 
by others and himself. This has been demonstrated with judgments of popularity 
among high school senior classmates. The data on "objective position" effects 
seem consistent with a variety of studies dealing with the status of occu­
pations in national prestige structures and persons in community prestige 
studies. The independent influence of self-definition of status is an 
interesting and important finding that has not been adequately explored in 
other types of status systems (Blau, 1957).
Discussion
There are two broad, perspectivai antinomies that coexist in the social 
and psychological branches of social psychology. Sociologically, it is 
generally maintained that social reality is defined by consensus about the 
attribute values of social objects; and status is certainly the most critical 
social attribute within this tradition. Perceptual-judgmental-social 
psychology, however, has argued that an individual's cognitive structuring 
of stimuli realms depends upon his location (anchor, standard, position) 
within the realm.
Both traditions stress that their opposing predictions should be most 
evident when the objects and events are significant to actors and important 
for societal functioning. Both agree that these important areas are usually 
those in which stimulus values are defined by "social reality". Thus, on the 
one hand, interaction is inconceivable without shared cognitive categoriza­
tions of relevant objects of mutual orientation; but, on the other, there is 
impressive and undeniable documentation that individuals differ systematically 
in the way they perceptually structure object-universes.
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Regarding the perception of status attributes, we cannot assume a_ social 
reality above the ordinal level. Rather, there must be pluralistic, but 
systematically definable, social realities regarding the absolute stimulus 
values of objects in status structures. The data analyzed show that this is 
indeed the case, and that these differences depend upon the independent 
influences of objective and subjective positionings of judges within the • 
status systems. Since these differences should influence the way people act 
and interact, they need to be given more extensive theoretical attention.
If this area is explored systematically, we may find that people are 
responding to their differential perceptions of the "same" status-related 
attributes rather than giving different responses to perceptually similar 
worlds. Apart from learning more about the cognitive impact of social 
structures on the persons who encounter them from different perspectives, 
further study will undoubtedly lead us to clarify and refine theoretical 
formulations that base their hypotheses on the perceived stimulus values 
of status-objects. There is hardly a more critical or central aspect of 
social reality that deserves precise theoretical definition and measure­
ment in sociology.
TABLE 1
MEAN POPULARITY AND ATTRACTION JUDGMENTS— BY 
POPULARITY OF JUDGES AND JUDGED
JUDGMENTS OF
AttractionPopularity
Popularity of Judged Popularity of JudgedPopularity of Judge
High Medium Low High Medium Low
6.7 4.7 3.1 6.7 5.3 3.7
(44) (44)
High
(34)
7־3 5 -1 5•6 (34)3־3 5.0 6.8Medium
7.1 5.5 3.8(19) 6.3 5.5 4.4(ig)Low
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULARITY JUDGMENTS— BY 
POPULARITY OF JUDGES
Distribution of Popularity Judgments 
Upper Third Middle Third Lower Third
Popularity of Judge
(44)2.64.87.3High
(34)2.95.17.4Medium
(19)3.45.67.7Low
TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF MEAN POPULARITY JUDGMENTS — BY 
POPULARITY AND SELF-PLACEMENTS OF JUDGES
Distribution of 
Popularity Judgments
Lower Third
(27)
(11) 
( 5)
2.7
2.5
2.0
Upper Third Middle Third 
7.6 5.1
4.3
3.9
6.6
6.8
Judge's Self-
Placement
High
Medium
Low
( 7) 
(21) 
( 5)
3.6
2.7
2.6
6.1
4.9
4.4
8.2
7.1
6.8
High
Medium
Low
( 5) 
( 9) 
( 5)
3.6
3.6 
3.0
6.1
5.5
5.5
8.0
7.5
7.7
High
Medium
Low
Popularity 
of Judge 
High
Medium
Low
FOOTNOTE TO TITLE
These data were gathered while the author held a Graduate Fellowship 
Award from the National Science Foundation, and their preparation for 
publication is coordinate with research being pursued under NSF grant 
GS-2095, ;'The Influence of Occupational Prestige Perceptions on Adolescents' 
Aspirations".
REFERENCES
Alexander, C.N. Jr.
1965 "Structural Perceptions : Displacement Phenomena in the Absolute
Judgment of Affective Stimuli", (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of North Carolina).
Blau, Peter, M.
1957 ‘־Occupational Bias and Ilobility", American Sociological Review,
23 (August), pp. 392-399.
Davies, A.F.
1952 "Prestige of Occupations", . British Journal of Sociology, 3,
(December), pp. 134-147.
Davis, Allison, B.B. Gardner and Ilary R. Gardner.
1941 Deep South, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Kelson, Harry.
1964 Adaptation-level Theory: An Experimental and Systematic Approach
to Behavior, New York: Harper & Row.
Lewis, L.S.
1964 "Class and the Perception of Class", Social Forces, 42
(March), pp. 336-340.
Reiss, A.J.
1961 Occupations and Social Status, Glencoe: The Free Press.
Sherif, Muzafer, and Carl I. Hovland.
1961 Social Judgment, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Warner, W. Lloyd, Marcia Meeker, and Kenneth Eels.
1949 Social Class in America. Chicago: Science Research Associates.
Weinstein, E.A.
1957-58 "Children's Conceptions of Occupational Stratification",
Sociology and Social Research, (Ilarch-April), 42, pp. 278-284.
